Other objections to the “equal weight” opinion are not related to another specific view of differences of opinion, and some are more than mere “equal weight” view. In this section, we briefly examine some of these objections. With these points in mind, we can formulate the primary questions about the theory of knowledge of disagreement. There is a concern about how such principles might be fundamental. In the epistemic case, the criterion of epistemical circularity was as follows: the epistemical principle F is circular, whether your best epistemtic reason for F F`s Adout, or if F has the appropriate episteremic status. More broadly, one might think that a normative principle N is normative, if your best normative reason for supporting N N, or if it assumes that N has the corresponding normative status. For example, the best normative reason for thinking that people have a moral status includes or assumes that people have a certain moral status (for example. B, inalienable rights or property, to be sensitive to just and erroneous action). The problem is that this is not necessarily the case: such principles may generally be acquired, but some people find themselves in a seemingly profound disagreement about them, because they consider the first belligerent to be true and the latter to be false. Perhaps it should be self-evident for the second person, but there is a cognitive block on this characteristic of the principle for that person; or perhaps the person chooses to reject it for no normative reason, and there is only one causal psychological explanation for its rejection. Of course, there is the possibility that the proponent of the fundamental normative principle has to simply deny that such a case is a profound disagreement. But keep the opinion that this is no less plausible. But there is another sense of integrity with which one could work, familiar with logic and mathematics, which is the formal term logical and semantic.
We might therefore think that a normative principle N is fundamental if it is not logically associated with another normative principle that we accept. The problem with this notion of integrity here is that it will be trivial satisfied if N is a conditional imperative, like “in C, φ no!” (for example: if your evidence p is not sure, p) because such conditional standards are not strictly driven by anything. Similarly, any categorical imperative, such as “φ not!” (For example, don`t think that proposals that aren`t supported by your evidence would also count, because they wouldn`t even logically follow on their own, because they don`t have strict implications. Formally, there is no relationship of truth between imperatives of any kind. So, on such an image, any imperative principle would be considered fundamental to the theory that is too permissive.